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ABSTRACT
On 22 January 2021, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) 
entered into force. The TPNW has resulted in a mixed response from the international 
community, instigating much discussion on certain provisions and features of the 
TPNW. Yet underpinning these analyses rests a commonly shared premise; that the 
TPNW constitutes a further example of humanitarian disarmament, placing the 
interests of victims and humanity at the centre of discussions of nuclear weapons and 
disarmament. This article seeks to reveal a coinciding yet somewhat underexplored, 
hidden nature of the TPNW by demonstrating how the treaty also incorporates State-
based security-driven interests alongside these humanitarian aspirations. While most 
commentators do not deny the existence of such interests at stake in the TPNW 
process, few have analysed the extent to which State-based security considerations 
have been incorporated in the final text of the TPNW. After having revealed the 
continued presence of State-centred security considerations in the TPNW’s negotiation, 
preambular provisions and operative text, this article concludes by discussing some 
possible implications stemming from the determination that the TPNW is inspired by, 
and reflects, both humanitarian and security objectives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons (TPNW)1 in July 2017 has been described as 
‘the end of a period of stagnation’ in international nuclear 
disarmament law which has lasted more than twenty 
years.2 While TPNW proponents have hailed the treaty as 
a ‘welcome addition to the nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament regime’,3 the nuclear weapon-possessing 
States (NWPS) and various commentators have criticised 
the treaty as both conceptually flawed and ‘idealistic’.4 On 
the day of the TPNW’s adoption, the United States (US), 
the United Kingdom (UK) and France announced that 
they ‘do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party’ 
to the treaty.5 Russia and China later supported a similar 
joint statement released in October 2018.6 Nevertheless, 
the TPNW has slowly been edging towards entry-into-
force, and achieved its 50th ratification, by Honduras on 
24 October 2020.7 In accordance with Article 15(1), the 
TPNW entered into force on 22 January 2021 and its 
obligations are now binding upon each State party that 
has ratified the agreement.8
Much of the discussion concerning the TPNW so far 
has focused on three main aspects. First, the relationship 
of the treaty to the existing nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament regime9 – particularly the ‘cornerstone’ 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT) 1968.10 Second, the scope of disarmament 
verification and safeguard measures imposed under 
Articles 3 and 4.11 Third, the treaty’s potential impact 
on nuclear deterrence policies and collective security 
arrangements.12 However, behind the majority of these 
existing discussions rests an underlying assumption that 
the TPNW was inspired and motivated, at least primarily, 
by a growing concern and awareness of the catastrophic 
humanitarian consequences that would stem from 
any detonation of nuclear weapons. As such, many 
commentators have argued that the TPNW represents 
a further example and consolidation of ‘Humanitarian 
Disarmament’, whereby the interests of humans, 
victims and humanity as a whole generally take priority, 
while to some extent marginalising ‘traditional’ State-
orientated security interests.13 They have supported 
this assertion by tracing the negotiating history of the 
TPNW and identifying certain human-centred provisions 
to emphasise how the treaty instigates a new era of 
humanitarian-inspired normative pressure on the NWPS 
by stigmatising and delegitimising nuclear weapons on 
the basis of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences 
stemming from their use.14
It is certainly indisputable that humanitarian-centred 
considerations based around the overarching need to 
address the catastrophic harm and suffering caused by 
nuclear weapons use and testing played a significant 
role throughout the development of the TPNW.15 At 
the same time, however, these same commentators 
generally tend to concede that the TPNW also 
emerged due to co-existing concerns over the security 
threat posed by nuclear weapons to States, alongside 
frustration with the slow pace of nuclear disarmament 
pursuant to Article VI of the NPT. Yet despite recognising 
the presence of such State-centred interests, these 
‘security-driven’ considerations have been somewhat 
cast-aside in recent assessments of the TPNW, 
relegated in favour of offering greater attention to the 
humanitarian concerns which inspired the negotiation 
of the treaty. Consequently, there has been virtually no 
extensive commentary and discussion thus far which 
has sought to the reveal the features of the TPNW 
and its negotiations which reflect this existing, though 
underexplored, security dimension behind the TPNW 
process.
This article seeks to fill this void by attempting to 
highlight various elements and characteristics of the 
TPNW’s provisions and negotiation process which allude 
to the co-existence of security-driven interests of States. 
The analysis that follows offers evidence for this claim by 
highlighting certain shared characteristics of ‘traditional’, 
or security-based disarmament instruments16 identified 
elsewhere by proponents of humanitarian disarmament 
such as Bonnie Docherty17 and Patrick McCarthy.18 By 
referring to these common features and characteristics 
identified by advocates of humanitarian disarmament, 
this article seeks to shed light on a presently hidden 
layer of the TPNW’s underlying purpose and turns to 
discuss some possible implications that this revealed 
security-driven nature may have for our assessment 
and engagement with the TPNW, humanitarian 
disarmament and efforts to categorise disarmament 
instruments generally.
Following this introduction, Part II briefly notes the 
shifting focus of disarmament efforts away from a State-
centred security considerations to a more humanitarian-
driven agenda, particularly since the 1990s. Part III 
then explains why the TPNW is frequently categorised 
as a further example of humanitarian disarmament 
by highlighting its various human and victim-focused 
features and provisions. Having acknowledged the 
humanitarian nature of the TPNW, Part IV seeks to reveal 
how the TPNW reflects security-driven considerations 
by incorporating certain elements and characteristics 
commonly included within ‘traditional’ disarmament 
instruments. Part V discusses some possible implications 
stemming from this article’s analysis for both the 
TPNW’s subsequent implementation and humanitarian 
disarmament generally, particularly in questioning 
the utility of the characterisations employed by 
commentators, alongside the benefits and need to 
categorise disarmaments instruments. Part VI offers 
some concluding thoughts.
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II. FROM ‘TRADITIONAL’ TO 
‘HUMANITARIAN’ DISARMAMENT
Although the emergence of humanitarian disarmament 
is generally regarded as a revolutionary and relatively 
recent phenomenon building upon the decreased 
tensions following the end of the Cold War,19 the 
relevance of humanitarian considerations has to some 
extent contributed to the decision of States to regulate 
the use of certain weapons for over 100-years.20 Notably, 
this has contributed partially towards the prohibitions 
on dum-dum bullets and asphyxiating gases by the 
1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions.21 However, despite 
this humanitarian influence, earlier disarmament 
negotiations generally tended to prioritise State-based 
security and strategic considerations as the primary 
justification for restricting certain arms.22
This ‘modern’ age of weapons regulation following the 
Second World War has been described as ‘traditional’,23 or 
‘security’ driven approaches to disarmament discussions 
among the major State powers of the time.24 Notable 
examples of traditional disarmament instruments which 
are primarily State-interest and security-focused are the 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 197225 and 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993.26 
The underlying premise of this period of ‘traditional 
disarmament’ was that the desire to prohibit and 
ultimately abolish particular categories of weapons was 
‘dominated by security concepts focusing on external 
threats to states’.27 As such, it was the fundamental 
interests of States that took prominence in earlier 
disarmament efforts, reflecting the fact that States 
were traditionally the only – or at least most significant – 
subject of the international legal system.28
Docherty, for example, has suggested that the 
regulation of biological and chemical weapons essentially 
aimed ‘to protect the interests of sovereign states’ by 
ensuring that these categories of weapons of mass 
destruction would not be used against themselves.29 
Indeed, once the major military powers perceived 
chemical and biological agents to be less militarily useful 
or desirable, it became strategically advantageous to 
prohibit such weapons to avoid their future use against 
the military dominant States.30 This is not to suggest 
that humanitarian ideals had no impact or influence 
whatsoever on the development of the BWC and CWC.31 
Instead, any coinciding humanitarian benefits of the non-
use of harmful chemical and biological weapons tended 
to be subordinated to the dominant security interests of 
States during traditional disarmament discussions.32
The concept of ‘humanitarian disarmament’ emerged 
in the mid-1990s as a challenge to the dominance of State-
driven considerations.33 Quite simply, and contrasting 
with the State-centrism of traditional disarmament 
instruments, ‘[h]umanitarian disarmament’s overarching 
principle is that people, not States, should be at the centre 
of efforts to govern problematic weapons’.34 Through this 
more explicit prioritisation of human and victims’ needs 
and interests, humanitarian disarmament ‘focuses 
on preventing and remediating human suffering and 
environmental harm’ caused by problematic weapons35 – 
that is weapons which are indiscriminate, inhumane and 
cause unnecessary suffering.36 This approach shifts the 
narrative away from the supposedly security-enhancing 
benefits brought by weapons, towards a focus on the 
unacceptable harm that the use of problematic weapons 
causes.37 Alongside preventing future harm caused by 
problematic weapons, humanitarian disarmament is 
retrospective to an extent, and looks back to ‘take care 
of the problems that already exist’ by remediating prior 
harm caused as well.38 Consequently, humanitarian 
disarmament maintains a connection to international 
humanitarian law,39 but goes beyond ‘questions of legality 
to include moral and political assessments of the effects 
of certain weapons on both civilians and combatants’.40
These principles underlying humanitarian 
disarmament have since become a regular feature 
of disarmament discussion after the Cold War,41 and 
coincided with the broader interest in humanitarianism 
which has given rise to related concepts such as human 
security42 and humanitarian intervention.43 The first 
success for the humanitarian disarmament movement 
came with the adoption of the Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention in 1997 (APMBC), an instrument which 
sought to eliminate indiscriminate anti-personnel 
mines, and highlighting the need to adopt remedial 
measures to address the explosive remnants of anti-
personnel mines left behind following the end of armed 
conflicts.44 The negotiations, process and formula of 
the APMBC subsequently inspired the adoption of the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in 2008.45 The 
TPNW is frequently regarded as the third invocation of 
humanitarian disarmament efforts,46 particularly due to 
various characteristics and elements of its negotiation, 
purpose and provisions, discussed next.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TPNW 
AS A HUMANITARIAN DISARMAMENT 
INSTRUMENT
With this relatively brief understanding of humanitarian 
disarmament in mind, the following section seeks to 
summarise which characteristics and features are 
supposedly indicative of the TPNW’s human and victim-
centred nature. In particular, both Docherty and Rietiker 
refer to three specific features of the TPNW to support 
their claims: first, the TPNW’s negotiating history and 
process; second its humanitarian purpose reflected within 
the treaty’s preamble paragraphs; and finally, various 
provisions of the TPNW which allude to the treaty’s 
human-centred and victim-orientated approach.47
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A. NEGOTIATION PROCESS
A notable feature of humanitarian disarmament 
instruments is that the negotiation process frames the 
discussion of the specific weapon in question in terms 
of human-centred interests as the ‘driving force’ behind 
the treaty instrument adopted.48 The Ottawa Declaration 
of October 1996, for example, explicitly acknowledged 
that ‘the extreme humanitarian and socio-economic 
costs associated with the use of anti-personnel mines 
requires urgent action on the part of the international 
community to ban and eliminate this type of weapons’.49 
Furthermore, the negotiation process tends to be 
inclusive, flexible and innovative,50 in which engaged 
States are ‘open to viewing civil society groups as the 
possessors and purveyors of expertise, field experience 
and energy potentially beneficial to multilateral 
negotiation processes’.51 The APMBC, for instance, was 
spearheaded by the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines, which worked in conjunction with like-
minded middle-power States, many of which had been 
heavily affected by anti-personnel mines long after the 
conclusion of armed conflicts.52 In addition, both the 
academic and scientific community and victims of the 
use of problematic weapons play a central role during 
the negotiation process,53 using their experience and 
expertise to highlight the humanitarian effects of the 
prohibited weapon in question, thereby giving ‘a voice to 
the people whom the weapons endangered as well as 
ownership over the outcome to a range of participants’.54
The TPNW negotiation process certainly reflects these 
identified trends.55 The TPNW emerged from what is 
commonly referred to as the ‘Humanitarian Initiative’,56 
a global campaign which sought to reframe the debate 
around nuclear weapons towards a human-centred 
approach, with a particular emphasis on highlighting 
the catastrophic harm caused by nuclear weapons 
detonations on civilians.57 This humanitarian reframing 
was explicitly included in the final document of the 2010 
NPT Review Conference which noted the
‘deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian 
consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and 
reaffirms the need for all States at all times to 
comply with applicable international law, including 
international humanitarian law’.58
To further facilitate the reframing of nuclear weapons 
through a humanitarian lens, a series of ‘humanitarian 
conferences’ focusing upon the effects of nuclear weapon 
use were held in Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna between 
March 2013 and December 2014.59 These conferences 
principally sought to raise awareness in both attending 
State participants and the wider public of ‘the devastating 
consequences of the use of nuclear weapons for the 
human being, as well as to assess the risk of nuclear war 
or of the accidental explosion of a nuclear weapon’.60 
The final Vienna Conference in December 2014 saw the 
adoption of the ‘Humanitarian Pledge’ by the Austrian 
Representative Michael Linhart, which noted the need to 
‘identify, and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap 
for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons… 
in light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences 
and associated risks’.61 Alongside the pledge, further 
‘joint statements on the humanitarian consequences 
of nuclear weapons’ were also issued by Switzerland on 
behalf of 16 States at the NPT Preparatory Committee 
2012.62 By the time the statement was delivered by 
New Zealand during the 2014 United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) First Committee, it was co-sponsored 
by 155 States,63 while the humanitarian pledge had 
127 co-sponsoring States by April 2016.64 The growth 
of support for these various statements clearly reflects 
the broader swing in emphasis toward the humanitarian 
imperative of achieving nuclear disarmament which 
ultimately informed the TPNW process amongst 
participating States.65
Following the second Open-Ended Working Group held 
in 2016 on taking forward multilateral disarmament, the 
UNGA First Committee adopted Resolution L.41, which 
again expressed deep concern ‘about the catastrophic 
humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear 
weapons’, and called upon states to ‘convene in 2017 a 
United Nations Conference to negotiate a legally binding 
instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons leading towards 
their total elimination’.66 The fact that the TPNW was 
subsequently negotiated outside of the consensus-based 
Conference on Disarmament also bucked the trend of 
traditional nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament 
negotiations too, as did the expeditious four weeks of 
formal negotiations across two sessions in March and 
June–July 2017.
Furthermore, the TPNW negotiation process was 
inclusive, taking ‘into account the perspectives of those 
who might be affected by nuclear weapons rather than 
focusing on the interest of states that had the potential 
to use them’.67 Ruff in particular notes that the level of 
civil society participation throughout the Humanitarian 
Initiative and TPNW negotiation conference was 
unprecedented in nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament law.68 The International Campaign to 
Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), for example, served 
as an ‘umbrella organization for nuclear-disarmament 
groups’,69 providing a single, credible ‘point of contact’ 
for like-minded middle-power non-nuclear weapon 
states (NNWS), notably Ireland, Mexico, Austria and New 
Zealand, to organise their efforts.70 The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also took on a more 
prominent role in nuclear disarmament discussions in 
the late 2000s.71 Following a powerful, humanitarian-
framed speech given in 2010 by ICRC President Jakob 
Kellenberger recalling the vast devastation caused 
by nuclear weapons at Hiroshima,72 the International 
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Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement released a 
Resolution in November 2011 endorsing the ‘framework 
of humanitarian diplomacy’. The Resolution appealed to 
all States to ‘conclude with urgency and determination 
negotiations to prohibit the use of and completely 
eliminate nuclear weapons through a legally binding 
international agreement’.73
In addition, the academic community made a 
significant contribution to the three Humanitarian 
Conferences. Experts presented findings on the 
environmental,74 economic and infrastructural 
consequences of nuclear weapon use,75 alongside the 
dangers of nuclear risks and accidents.76 Physician Ira 
Helfand, for example, presented a climate model which 
concluded that a limited nuclear exchange would result 
in devastating climatic change, global starvation and the 
collapse of the international agricultural system.77 This 
evidence emphasised among participating NNWS the 
humanitarian imperative of prohibiting and eliminating 
nuclear weapons based upon their uncontrollable, 
catastrophic humanitarian effects.78 In addition, 
hibakusha – survivors and descendants of the Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki bombings – including Tanaka Terumi and 
Setsuko Thurlow provided powerful testimonies of the 
physical, social and psychological impact of nuclear 
weapon use, describing first-hand the catastrophic harm 
and effects caused by nuclear weapons and exposure 
to radioactive fallout.79 Alongside statements of support 
from the Holy See,80 these speeches advanced the ‘moral’ 
imperative of eliminating nuclear weapons on the basis 
of their catastrophic impact on humanity.81
Finally, the involvement of experts and civil society 
groups continued throughout the TPNW negotiations 
sessions in 2017. Gibbons, for instance, notes that 
ICAN maintained its coordinating role by reviewing the 
latest developments and planning the upcoming day’s 
strategies.82 Other civil society groups including the Arms 
Control Association83 and the ICRC presented working 
papers offering their expert insights on some of the 
core elements and features of the ban treaty.84 Perhaps 
the most visible instance of civil society participation 
occurred during the First Session held between 27–31 
March, where President Whyte Gómez convened two 
informal panel meetings, led by experts from civil 
society, to discuss matters of greater complexity such as 
verification issues and accession provisions.85
B. PREAMBULAR PURPOSE
A further illustration of the TPNW’s humanitarian nature 
can be found within its preambular provisions.86 As a 
general matter, treaty preambles do not contain legally-
binding obligations for States parties,87 but instead, 
may define ‘the purposes and considerations that led 
the parties to conclude the treaty’.88 In this sense, the 
preamble forms part of a treaty’s overall context,89 which 
for the purposes of treaty interpretation in particular can 
help determine the negotiating parties’ motivations for 
adopting the treaty, thus helping identify the object and 
purpose of the treaty in question.90
Reflecting the humanitarian statements discussed 
in Part III.A, preambular paragraph 2 states that TPNW 
parties are ‘[d]eeply concerned about the catastrophic 
humanitarian consequences that would result from any 
use of nuclear weapons’.91 This immediately reframes 
the proposition that nuclear weapons effect the 
interests of humanity as a whole, thus informing the 
very object and purpose of the TPNW. Consequently, the 
preamble proceeds to emphasise that the elimination 
of nuclear weapons is the ‘only way to guarantee 
that nuclear weapons are never used again under any 
circumstances’.92 The preamble further frames the TPNW 
as human and victim-orientated by noting that States 
parties are ‘[m]indful of the unacceptable suffering 
and harm caused to the victims of the use of nuclear 
weapons (hibakusha), as well as of those affected by the 
testing of nuclear weapons’.93 This further illustrates the 
prioritisation of human and victim needs and interests, 
which are given extensive coverage within the TPNW 
preamble.94
The preamble also reiterates that ‘the catastrophic 
consequences of nuclear weapons cannot be adequately 
addressed, transcend national borders, pose grave 
implications for human survival, the environment, 
socioeconomic development, the global economy, food 
security and the health of current and future generations, 
and have a disproportionate impact on women and girls, 
including as a result of ionizing radiation’.95 This paragraph 
is clearly inspired by the scientific evidence presented 
during the three Humanitarian Conferences,96 and the 
general conclusion noted at the first Oslo Conference 
that no State would be able to adequately respond to a 
nuclear weapon detonation.97
In addition, Docherty also notes that the preamble 
‘places the TPNW in a humanitarian legal framework’ 
through its detailed references to principles of 
international humanitarian law (IHL).98 Following the 
approach of both the APMBC99 and CCM,100 the preamble 
reaffirms ‘the need for all States at all times to comply 
with applicable international law, including international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law’.101 
Paragraph 9 identifies specific IHL principles which must 
be respected, including:
‘the principle that the right of parties to an 
armed conflict to choose methods or means of 
warfare is not unlimited, the rule of distinction, 
the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, 
the rules on proportionality and precautions in 
attack, the prohibition on the use of weapons of a 
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering, and the rules for the protection of the 
natural environment’.102
57Evans Utrecht Journal of International and European Law DOI: 10.5334/ujiel.532
Moreover, the preamble further declares ‘that any use 
of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular 
the principles and rules of international humanitarian 
law’,103 while proceeding to note that ‘any use of nuclear 
weapons would also be abhorrent to the principles 
of humanity and the dictates of public conscience’.104 
Significantly, this reference goes considerably further 
than the ICJ’s conclusion reached in the Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion in 1996,105 in which the Court suggested 
that the use of nuclear weapons would ‘generally’ 
be contrary to IHL principles, but could not ‘conclude 
definitely whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance 
of self-defence’.106 Although this preambular paragraph 
is certainly a controversial paragraph in light of the 
ICJ’s prior assessment,107 given that one of the primary 
objectives of IHL is to ‘moderate the conduct of armed 
conflict and to mitigate the suffering that it causes’,108 
the ‘explicit invocation of that body of law [IHL] suggests 
a humanitarian nature’ and purpose within the TPNW.109
C. HUMANITARIAN PROVISIONS
A final illustration of the TPNW’s humanitarian nature 
concerns the content of the treaty’s operative provisions. 
According to Docherty, three categories of the TPNW’s 
provisions are ‘characteristic of past humanitarian 
disarmament treaties: absolute preventive obligations, 
remedial measures and cooperative approaches to 
implementation’.110 While this author agrees with the 
final two features, the discussion in Parts IV and V below 
questions the view that preventive obligations, particularly 
relating to absolute prohibitions and the destruction of 
stockpiles, are indicative of the TPNW’s humanitarian 
nature.111
For now, however, it is evident that the humanitarian 
nature of the TPNW is reflected within specific articles that 
establish positive obligations taking the form of remedial 
measures requiring States parties to assist victims and 
address the environmental damage caused by nuclear 
weapons use and testing.112 Certain remedial measures 
were incorporated in the APMBC, specifically Article 5 
which requires each State party to ‘destroy or ensure the 
destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas 
under its jurisdiction or control’.113 Alongside comparable 
clearance obligations to the APMBC, CCM goes a step 
further by imposing a positive obligation relating to victim 
assistance under Article 5, which requires each State 
party to ‘adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive 
assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and 
psychological support, as well as provide for their social 
and economic inclusion’.114 Such provisions clearly seek 
to address the previous harm caused by anti-personnel 
mines and cluster munitions, whilst simultaneously aim 
to minimise any future harm that could be caused by 
unexploded remnants.
These evidently victim-focused provisions directly 
inspired the text of Article 6(1) of the TPNW,115 which 
provides in full, that:
‘Each State Party shall, with respect to individuals 
under its jurisdiction who are affected by the use 
or testing of nuclear weapons, in accordance with 
applicable international humanitarian and human 
rights law, adequately provide age- and gender-
sensitive assistance, without discrimination, 
including medical care, rehabilitation and 
psychological support, as well as provide for their 
social and economic inclusion’.116
This provision emphasises the centrality of humanitarian 
considerations within the TPNW by requiring parties 
to take clear steps to address prior harm and suffering 
caused to victims by both the use and testing of nuclear 
weapons within their jurisdiction.117 Moreover, drawing 
from related preambular paragraphs,118 this obligation 
seeks to address harm caused to specific groups, 
including women, children and indigenous populations 
who have been displaced from their cultural lands. This is 
a particularly significant obligation for the Pacific region 
where nuclear testing by both the US and France was 
rife throughout the Cold War in the Marshall Islands and 
French Polynesia respectively.119
In addition, Article 6(2) expressly requires States 
parties to ‘take necessary and appropriate measures 
towards the environmental remediation of areas so 
contaminated’ by the use or testing of nuclear weapons 
within areas under its jurisdiction or control.120 Though 
not expressly couched in humanitarian concerns, it is 
evident that requiring steps to remediate damage caused 
to the environment serves an important humanitarian 
purpose in protecting a ‘global commons’ through the 
imposition of legally-binding positive commitments.121 
Importantly, contrary to the general principle of non-
retroactivity of treaty provisions to cover past actions,122 
the positive obligations under Article 6(1) and (2) cover 
both past, present and future testing and use of nuclear 
weapons.123
Although primary responsibility for assistance 
remediation under Article 6 rests with the affected 
State in which the testing or use of nuclear weapons 
occurred124 – which in many cases will not be the same 
State that carried out the nuclear testing activity, and 
may ultimately not be in a position to adequately fulfil 
its obligations under Article 6(1) and (2)125 – Article 7 
establishes a general obligation upon States parties to 
cooperate when implementing the positive obligations 
under Article 6. Article 7(3), for example, establishes an 
obligation on each State party ‘in a position to do so’ to 
provide technical, material or financial assistance to other 
TPNW parties affected by nuclear weapon testing.126 
Although this obligation is somewhat qualified,127 
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Docherty correctly notes that ‘[b]ecause assistance can 
come in a variety of forms – technical, material and 
financial – all states should be in a position to help in 
some way’.128
Finally, Article 7(6) recalls that a State party which has 
‘used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear 
explosive devices shall have a responsibility to provide 
adequate assistance to State Parties, for the purpose of 
victim assistance and environmental remediation’.129 
However, should no NWPS join the TPNW, this provision 
will remain of no immediate effect. Overall, by 
encouraging cooperative approaches to implementation, 
Article 7 reflects the shared goodwill on the part of TPNW 
States parties in meeting their humanitarian-based 
obligations under Article 6.
IV. HOW THE TPNW INCORPORATES 
STATE-CENTRED SECURITY INTERESTS
Despite there being clear, and to some degree extensive, 
evidence that the TPNW constitutes a further example of 
humanitarian disarmament,130 there are certain elements 
and features of the treaty which alludes to the continuing 
presence of coinciding State-orientated security interests. 
This Section intends to reveal and explore these present 
security characterisations in greater depth as indicated 
within the TPNW negotiation process, preambular purpose 
and operative provisions. Whilst again adopting the 
characterising features used by Docherty and McCarthy 
used in Part III above, it will become apparent that the 
identifying checklist used to categorise disarmament 
instruments becomes problematic and overly malleable 
in its application. Criticisms of these characterising 
features and their application by commentators will be 
explored further in Part V.131
A. NEGOTIATION PROCESS
A defining feature of security disarmament instruments is 
that their negotiation processes are firstly ‘monopolized 
by states, specifically by military powers’,132 and secondly, 
that the participating States seek to prohibit the weapon 
in question due to the threat such weapons pose to 
State security interests.133 Furthermore, the negotiating 
history and process of traditional disarmament treaties 
often lack transparency, with the consultations being 
dominated by military officials and diplomats seeking 
to advance the agenda of their respective States.134 This 
often leads to time-consuming and lengthy discussions 
in consensus-based forums such as the Conference on 
Disarmament, which in turn creates a de facto veto 
power in the hands of the military powerful States – in 
this case, present NWPS.135
The CWC serves as a useful example. Although 
humanitarian considerations helped motivate early 
efforts to prohibit the use of asphyxiating gases and 
other chemicals in the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925,136 by 
the 1970s, the utility and benefits of chemical weapons 
as methods of warfare for the major military powers was 
no longer as strategically important.137 Consequently, the 
military powers of the time sought to prohibit chemical 
weapons primarily due to strategic factors, with the aim 
of limiting the possible proliferation of chemical weapons 
by further States and prohibiting their use against the 
major military powers.138 Another example of this would 
be the NPT,139 in which the US and the Soviet Union which 
generally maintained control over the negotiations by 
exerting influence over their respective blocs within the 
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Commission.140 Indeed, 
the underlying concern shared by both the US and Soviet 
Union during the NPT negotiations to limit the spread of 
nuclear weapons was driven out of a desire to minimise 
the threat of nuclear weapons being in the hands of 
numerous, often adversarial States.
With this brief description in mind, it seems difficult 
to contend that the TPNW reflects traditional security-
based disarmament negotiations, particularly given the 
above discussion in Part III.A.141 Indeed, none of the nine 
NWPS or their military allies, with the exception of the 
Netherlands,142 participated in the 2017 negotiations and 
their participation in the three Humanitarian Conferences 
also varied.143 Furthermore, as noted previously, the TPNW 
negotiations took place in an independent conference, 
thus stepping outside of traditional nuclear disarmament 
forums such as the NPT Review Process.144 Finally, and 
in contrast to the rules of procedure of the Conference 
on Disarmament and NPT Review Process, the 2017 
negotiation conference rules of procedure confirmed 
that voting on matters of substance would be decided 
by a two-thirds majority of States present and voting if 
agreement could not be reached by consensus.145
Nevertheless, there remains some evidence to 
suggest that participating States also had security 
considerations in mind during the Humanitarian Initiative 
and negotiation conference.
First, as well as seeking to address the humanitarian 
consequences of nuclear weapons use, the non-aligned 
NNWS had a concurrent desire to address the slow pace of 
nuclear disarmament efforts pursuant to Article VI by the 
NPT-recognised nuclear weapon States (NWS),146 despite 
the fact the NNWS have, for the most part, refrained from 
acquiring nuclear weapons in accordance with Article 
II of the NPT.147 Indeed, it has been acknowledged by 
commentators analysing the humanitarian nature of 
the TPNW that this growing sense of frustration among 
the non-aligned NNWS, in conjunction with ‘an influx 
of advocates from previously successful [humanitarian] 
weapons-ban campaigns’,148 helped facilitate the 
adoption of the TPNW.149
This rationale is further supported when one considers 
the comparable subject matter, purpose and preceding 
context of both the NPT and TPNW. Whilst the NPT was 
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originally negotiated to address the threat posed by 
horizontal proliferation which would increase the risk of 
nuclear war,150 concerns over the increasing likelihood 
of nuclear exchange have arisen more recently given 
the development of nuclear weapon capabilities by 
‘irresponsible’ States such as the DPRK and Pakistan,151 
alongside the escalation of US tensions with Russia, Iran, 
China and the DPRK. As such, these existing concerns 
over the deteriorating international security environment 
in the present day may further indicate that State-based 
security interests remained of relevance during the TPNW 
negotiations.
A further example of coinciding security interests 
can be found in both statements and UNGA resolutions 
endorsing the Humanitarian Initiative, which repeatedly 
framed the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and the 
need for nuclear disarmament in terms of the threats both 
to States and international peace and security. During 
the Nayarit Conference in February 2014, for example, 
Switzerland referred to nuclear weapons as both a ‘threat 
to international security and humankind’.152 Austria 
advanced a comparable two-pronged stance during the 
2017 negotiation conference, claiming that a prohibition 
treaty would mean that ‘every State – including every 
NWS and every umbrella State – would be more secure 
and their people would be safer if no State had nuclear 
weapons’.153 These statements arguably indicate that 
both the Austrian and the Swiss delegations envisaged 
two types of dangers, which although perhaps closely 
interconnected, remain distinguishable in affecting both 
State and human security.
Similarly, during the 2016 Open-Ended Working Group 
‘Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament’ 
that recommended convening the 2017 negotiation 
conference,154 Sweden explained the underlying security 
dimension informing its own interest in pursuing new 
disarmament measures, stating;
‘One country’s claim to security through nuclear 
weapons, means another country’s insecurity 
and is problematic for non-proliferation efforts. 
Regional security concerns thought to be 
mitigated through the reliance on nuclear 
weapons don’t only affect that region negatively 
but also global security. In my government’s view 
a sustainable peace cannot be built with nuclear 
weapons and this makes the work we conduct 
here more important than ever’.155
While the Swedish statement also asserted that ‘[t]he 
humanitarian initiative continues to lay the foundation 
for our perspective’,156 each of the aforementioned 
statements attest to the co-existing nature of the security 
and humanitarian considerations of participating NNWS 
which informed their desire to pursue the negotiation of 
the TPNW.
Another overlooked source which demonstrates the 
co-existence of State-based security interests amongst 
the non-aligned NNWS during the lead up to the TPNW 
negotiations are various UNGA resolutions concerning 
nuclear disarmament. Many of these resolutions 
emphasise on the one hand how nuclear disarmament 
is ‘essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the 
strengthening of international peace and security’, while 
at the same time recognising the ‘most serious threat to 
the survival of mankind’ posed by nuclear weapons.157 
Others suggest that the use of nuclear weapons would 
be both a ‘violation of the UN Charter and a crime against 
humanity’.158 Although some of these resolutions were 
issued to support the commencement of negotiations of 
a proposed Nuclear Weapons Convention,159 they were 
still adopted with the support of many of the non-aligned 
NNWS involved in the Humanitarian Initiative and TPNW 
negotiations, albeit within some notable absentees,160 
and clearly allude to the dual-interests at stake informing 
their efforts towards disarmament.
Consequently, it seems that the TPNW negotiation 
process does indicate that State-based security-driven 
interests remained of importance amongst the non-
aligned NNWS. Although it is perhaps fair to conclude 
that the existence of security-centred rhetoric took on 
a somewhat ‘secondary’ role compared to the broader 
humanitarian considerations underpinning the TPNW 
negotiation process as outlined previously,161 this does 
not dispute the fact that such State-centred interests 
continue to exert some influence on the desire to 
negotiation the TPNW.
B. PREAMBULAR REFERENCES TO SECURITY
Building upon the State-centred security references in the 
negotiation process of the TPNW, an additional feature 
of traditional disarmament instruments – specifically 
epitomised by the BWC and CWC – are explicit references 
to security framed objectives within their respective 
preambles. In categorising the CWC, Docherty argues 
that the Convention’s preamble ‘defines its security 
objectives in terms of preserving peace’162 through the 
explicit recognition of the shared desire of States parties 
to ‘contribute to the realization of the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations’,163 with a 
determination to ‘act with a view of achieving effective 
progress towards general and complete disarmament’.164 
Put differently, by referencing the United Nations (UN) 
Charter, traditional disarmament instruments endorse 
the Charter’s objectives of ‘maintain[ing] international 
peace’ by settling breaches of the peace and international 
disputes by peaceful means,165 and ‘developing friendly 
relations among nations’.166 This has led Docherty to 
conclude that ‘[w]ith its references to the UN Charter and 
general and complete disarmament, the preamble of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention indicates that its purpose 
is inextricably linked to the concerns of nation states’.167
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Despite clearly reflecting the humanitarian 
motivations behind the TPNW, its preamble incorporates 
similar security-orientated references immediately in 
paragraph 1, which –like the CWC – notes that States 
parties are ‘determined to contribute to the realization of 
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations’.168 The preamble, however, goes beyond the CWC 
and recalls that ‘in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, States must refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State… and that the establishment and maintenance of 
international peace and security are to be promoted with 
the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human 
and economic resources’.169 These are clearly State-
centred references under Docherty’s own assessment, 
emphasising the necessity of upholding the objectives 
of the UN Charter which seeks to promote peace and 
stability amongst States, coupled with reference to how 
international peace and security are enhanced through 
arms regulation.
Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, no 
comparable references to security-centred considerations 
or the UN Charter were included within either the 
APMBC or CCM; the prior two examples of humanitarian 
disarmament from which inspiration for the TPNW 
emerged.170 In this respect, the TPNW’s reaffirmation of 
security objectives within the preamble marks a clear 
departure from existing humanitarian disarmament 
instruments. At the same time, it is certainly plausible 
to suggest that references to upholding the purposes of 
the UN Charter can serve a humanitarian objectives too. 
Indeed, while the Charter’s first, and arguably paramount 
objective is to ‘maintain international peace and security’, 
this incidentally brings further humanitarian benefits 
by reducing the frequency of armed conflict, thereby 
alleviating the suffering and harm caused by hostilities.
Finally, an explicit reference to State security interests 
is provided by preambular paragraph 5. Admittedly, this 
paragraph begins by acknowledging the ‘ethical imperatives 
for nuclear disarmament and the urgency of achieving 
and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world, which is 
a global public good’,171 thereby framing the imperative 
necessity of nuclear disarmament in humanitarian based 
terms.172 However, the paragraph subsequently continues 
by explicitly recognising that maintaining a nuclear-free 
world would also serve ‘both national and collective security 
interests’.173 Like the various aforementioned statements 
noted during the TPNW negotiation process, preambular 
paragraph 5 explicitly notes both the humanitarian and 
State-centred security benefits that would result from 
achieving nuclear disarmament.
C. OPERATIVE PROVISIONS
Despite the inclusion of humanitarian inspired 
positive obligations relating to victim assistance and 
environmental remediation and the cooperative 
approaches to implementation under Articles 6 and 
7 respectively,174 the TPNW also contains provisions 
which reflect its security-orientated nature. According 
to Docherty, there are two primary operative provisions 
which clearly allude to a disarmament instrument’s 
State-centred security purpose:
‘[s]ecurity disarmament treaties focus on the 
elimination of certain weapons of war… They 
impose absolute bans on activities involving arms, 
such as use, production, transfer, and stockpiling. 
Security disarmament treaties also require the 
destruction of existing stockpiles to decrease the 
threat of future use’.175
As such, absolute prohibitions, coupled with stockpile 
destruction and disarmament provisions are common 
components of traditional disarmament instruments 
according to Docherty’s assessment. These features are 
also incorporated within the TPNW’s operative provisions.
Firstly, like the CWC,176 Article 1 of the TPNW establishes 
an absolute ban on nuclear weapons related activities 
including prohibitions on the use or threat of use,177 
possession, manufacture, development and testing of 
nuclear weapons.178 Moreover, the TPNW prohibits both 
the transfer and receipt of nuclear weapons by States 
parties,179 alongside an undertaking never to assist or 
encourage ‘in any way, anyone to engage in any activity 
prohibited’ under the treaty.180 Quite significantly, Article 
(1)(g) prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons within 
the territory, jurisdiction or control of States parties too.181 
Given the breadth of these prohibitions, Casey-Maslen 
has suggested that the TPNW establishes the most 
comprehensive array of prohibitions of any international 
disarmament instrument negotiated so far.182
Moreover, like both the BWC and CWC,183 the TPNW 
also imposes clear obligations to disarm and destroy 
existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Indeed, Article 
4 establishes the primary disarmament obligations 
applicable to each acceding NWPS, requiring these 
States to accede to the TPNW and eliminate their 
respective nuclear weapons through one of two distinct 
disarmament ‘pathways’.184 Article 4(1) takes a ‘destroy 
then join’ approach,185 allowing NWPS to eliminate their 
nuclear weapons stockpiles and facilities first before 
acceding to the TPNW. Alternatively, Article 4(2) provides 
for a ‘join and destroy’ option, in which an acceding 
NWPS that ‘owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices shall immediately 
remove them from operational status, and destroy them 
as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be 
determined by the first meeting of States Parties’.186 
These disarmament pathways are further supplemented 
by ‘Declaration’ requirements to be provided at the 
time of accession in accordance with Article 2,187 and 
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the obligation under Article 4(5) for NWPS to report to 
the Meeting of States Parties on their progress towards 
eliminating both nuclear weapons and connected 
facilities.188
However, despite conforming to Docherty’s 
characterisation of traditional disarmament instruments 
by including absolute prohibitions and stockpile 
destruction commitments in a similar manner to the CWC, 
a conceptual issue arises due to the determination that 
prohibitions and destruction provisions are also common 
to both the APMBC and CCM too.189 Indeed, Docherty 
explicitly notes that ‘[w]hile the Chemical Weapons 
Convention and the Mine Ban Treaty were conceived of 
for security and humanitarian purposes, respectively, 
they share absolute preventive provisions’.190 Put 
differently, reference to absolute preventive obligations 
can be indicative of both a treaty’s humanitarian and 
security-driven objectives. Consequently, and as will 
be discussed further in Part V, highlighting absolute 
prohibitions and disarmament obligations as evidence 
of a particular treaty’s ‘nature’ for the purposes of 
categorisation becomes open to overly flexible use. This 
may in turn undermine both the credibility and utility 
of the characterising ‘checklist’ employed by Docherty, 
McCarthy and Rietiker, among others, to categorise 
different disarmament instruments.191
A final illustration of how the TPNW’s provisions indicate 
the co-existence of security-based considerations can 
be unearthed within the Article 17 withdrawal clause. 
The TPNW takes an innovative approach to withdrawal 
in comparison to existing nuclear arms control, non-
proliferation and disarmament treaties, reflecting a 
balance between State-centred and humanitarian 
considerations.192 On the one hand, if, after the 12-month 
notice period has expired, ‘the withdrawing State Party is 
a party to an armed conflict, the State Party shall continue 
to be bound by the obligations of this Treaty and of any 
additional protocols until it is no longer party to an armed 
conflict’.193 This clause is inspired by Article 20(3) of both 
the APMBC and the CCM,194 and has the aim of preventing 
a TPNW party from announcing its withdrawal with the 
intention of using nuclear weapons in an armed conflict 
as soon as the 12-month notice period is satisfied.195 This 
evidently serves a humanitarian purpose – at least to 
some extent – by delaying the potential use of nuclear 
weapons (thus avoiding human suffering and harm) 
precisely when they are most likely to be used – during 
an armed conflict.196 Indeed, as Nystuen, Egeland and 
Graff Hugo note:
‘Central to the TPNW is the prohibition of use 
of nuclear weapons, due to its catastrophic 
humanitarian impact and incompatibility with 
international humanitarian law (IHL). It is argued 
that involvement in armed conflict raises the 
risk of a nuclear weapons use, and excluding 
withdrawal from the TPNW in such a situation 
therefore makes good sense’.197
On the other hand, these further requirements are 
preceded by Article 17(2) which contains what is 
commonly referred to as the ‘extraordinary events’ 
withdrawal clause. This clause was first included within 
the Partial Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in 1963198 and 
has been subsequently adopted in other ‘traditional’ 
disarmament instruments including Article X(1) of 
the NPT and Article XVI(2) of the CWC.199 However, the 
‘extraordinary events’ clause has been heavily criticised 
for establishing a purely subjective test, in which ‘the 
ultimate authority to determine whether there exists 
“extraordinary events” that would justify the withdrawal 
of a party from the NPT lies with the withdrawing party 
itself’.200 The subjective nature of the clause becomes 
apparent given the inclusion of phrases such as ‘if it [ie 
the withdrawing State] decides’ whether a particular 
extraordinary event related to the subject matter of 
the treaty has jeopardised ‘its’ subjectively determined 
supreme interests.
The extraordinary events clause in Article 17(2) 
is prone to these same weaknesses, but these are 
fortunately mitigated to some extent by the inclusion of 
the additional requirements of paragraph 3 noted above. 
However, most significantly for present purposes at least, 
are two points; first, neither the APMBC or CCM include 
an ‘extraordinary events’ clause within their respective 
withdrawal provisions; and second, the inclusion of 
the ‘extraordinary events’ clause arguably prioritises 
State-orientated subjectively determined ‘supreme 
interests’ – many of which will relate to self-defence 
and continuing survival – over collective humanitarian 
considerations. This has similarly been discussed by ICAN 
Director Beatrice Fihn who argues that the language of 
supreme interests in Article 17(2) ‘feeds the narrative 
that there are certain interests, there are certain reasons 
to have nuclear weapons which is just counter to the 
whole beginning of the treaty that bans them under any 
circumstances’.201 Indeed, Ritchie argued during the final 
stages of the negotiations that:
‘[i]t is arguably incongruous to base a prohibition 
on the unacceptable consequences of nuclear 
violence whilst ostensibly enabling states to pursue 
nuclear weapons capability after the current three 
months notice, or even twelve months as the 
negotiators are now suggesting. The very logic of 
the nuclear ban treaty delegitimises the sovereign 
prerogative to understand security in terms of 
nuclear weapons’.202
As such, the inclusion of the extraordinary events clause 
arguably runs counter to the TPNW’s central premise 
that nuclear weapons are considered illegitimate, 
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unacceptable weapons with devastating humanitarian 
consequences.203 Consequently, retaining the language 
of supreme interests as commonly included in traditional 
disarmament instruments such as the NPT and CWC 
ultimately reflects the security-driven interests of 
certain, though admittedly a small minority,204 of TPNW 
negotiating States which sought to retain a right to 
withdraw and prioritise individualistic considerations 
over human-centred objectives.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TPNW AND 
HUMANITARIAN DISARMAMENT
In light of the discussion above, there is certainly sufficient 
evidence which indicates that security-orientated 
interests remained influential during the development of 
the TPNW. These security elements continue to exist in 
tandem with the oft-mentioned humanitarian reference 
and should not be neglected or overlooked. In light of 
this determination, the remainder of this article intends 
to discuss certain implications of this conclusion for the 
broader assessment of the TPNW and the understanding 
or conceptualisation of humanitarian disarmament 
instruments generally.
A. RETHINKING THE IDENTIFYING ELEMENTS 
OF DISARMAMENT INSTRUMENTS
An initial observation concerns the characterising 
elements used by commentators to categorise 
disarmament instruments. Despite adopting what can 
essentially be described as a ‘checklists’ approach – 
establishing an initial point of reference when determining 
the nature of a particular disarmament instrument205 
– current analyses of the TPNW fail to accurately apply 
such characteristics when seeking to ‘categorise’ the 
treaty. Some commentators have consciously chosen not 
to discuss specific aspects of the TPNW preamble which 
demonstrate its security-driven nature.206 Docherty, 
by contrast, seemingly acknowledges the existence of 
certain security references within the TPNW preamble, 
but seems to dismiss their significance as being
‘unsurprising given that for decades before 
the TPNW was adopted, states viewed nuclear 
weapons through a security lens. They do not dilute 
the treaty’s humanitarian purpose, which is made 
clear by the quantity, placement and strength of 
relevant preambular paragraphs’.207
However, this conclusion neglects the fact that a 
security-based reference emphasising the importance 
of upholding the purposes of the UN Charter is situated 
immediately in the second preambular paragraph,208 
before any mentioning of victims, IHL principles and 
environmental harm, and the disproportionate effects 
of nuclear weapons on women, girls and indigenous 
populations.209 Rather than a remnant of previous 
disarmament negotiations, the explicit inclusion of 
security references arguably indicates a prominent – as 
opposed to incidental – role of State-driven security-
interests as reflected immediately in the preamble.
Furthermore, certain checklist ‘elements’ have been 
invoked as evidence to highlight both the security or 
humanitarian nature of a particular treaty. In other 
words, a single particular feature ‘X’ can, and has, been 
used as evidence to support both conclusion ‘Y’ and 
‘Z’, thereby creating a situation of ‘double-counting’ of 
sorts. This ‘double-counting’ arises in connection to 
preventive obligations of the TPNW, taking the form of 
absolute prohibitions under Article 1 and disarmament 
obligations under Article 4.210 Yet despite acknowledging 
that preventive obligations are commonly incorporated 
into the text of both ‘traditional’ and ‘humanitarian’ 
disarmament treaties,211 Docherty claims that the 
comprehensiveness of the TPNW’s absolute prohibitions 
serves to ‘advance the treaty’s humanitarian goal by 
working to prevent future harm’.212
To some extent, Docherty’s assessment is see-
mingly justified by recalling the broader context of 
the instrument in question,213 particularly in this 
case the IHL references in the TPNW preamble and 
positive obligations concerning Victim Assistance 
and International Cooperation in Articles 6 and 
7.214 However, her assessment fails to consider the 
entire TPNW context. Indeed, when one recalls the 
presence of various security-orientated references and 
characteristics present in the TPNW, such as the need 
to uphold the purposes of the UN Charter within the 
preamble – references noticeably absent in the APMBC 
and CCM215 – alongside the subjective ‘extraordinary 
events’ clause of Article 17(2),216 it can equally be 
argued that the preventive obligations under Articles 1 
and 4 reinforce the underlying security-based interests 
of States participating in the TPNW’s broader process 
and negotiation.
As a result, referencing the absolute prohibitions 
and disarmament obligations under Articles 1 and 4 
respectively as evidence of the TPNW’s humanitarian 
purpose loses some of its persuasive value when one 
can equally demonstrate that preventive obligations 
can similarly advance the security interests of States, 
as Docherty herself concedes.217 This may subsequently 
suggest that at least some – though admittedly not all – 
of the identifying characteristics noted by Docherty and 
McCarthy are somewhat too flexible to effectively use as 
a ‘checklist’ in order to accurately determine a treaty’s 
underlying ‘nature’ and motivations. One implication, 
therefore, is that these identifying characteristics may 
require revision to address the malleable manner in 
which the ‘checklists’ used can be applied in practice. 
Alternatively, it may be that a more conservative 
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approach is needed, whereby only specific characteristics 
of a treaty which can solely indicate either its security 
or humanitarian nature should be cited as evidence of 
the treaty’s predominant nature, thereby excluding the 
possibility of double-counting. This article is not the place 
to recommend such changes, but the present malleability 
of the identifying ‘checklist’ use by commentators must 
nonetheless be addressed if our assessment of the 
nature of a specific disarmament instruments in the 
future is to be credible.
B. THE VALUE OF CATEGORISATION?
A further implication stemming from the discussion 
above, is that the general acceptance of the TPNW as an 
illustration of humanitarian disarmament may need to 
be reconsidered in light of the clear presence of security-
centred references within the TPNW at various points. In 
contrast to McCarthy who identifies a dualistic distinction 
between traditional and humanitarian disarmament, 
Docherty endorses the existence of a middle-ground 
category disarmament instruments aptly named ‘hybrid’ 
disarmament.218 Taking the Convention on Conventional 
Weapons (CCW) of 1980 and its associated protocols 
as an example,219 Docherty argues that the underlying 
purpose of hybrid disarmament
‘combines concerns for protecting security and 
minimizing suffering of individuals. As a result, 
they [hybrid disarmament instruments] represent 
a blend of elements characteristic of security 
disarmament and humanitarian disarmament, 
while moving increasingly towards the latter’.220
In light of the conclusions reached in Part IV, is it 
more accurate to categorise the TPNW as a ‘hybrid’ 
disarmament instrument? The TPNW certainly shares 
various characteristics with the CCW, particularly 
comparable preambular paragraphs which Not needed 
identify State security concerns by emphasising the need 
to uphold the principle and purposes of the UN Charter.221 
And as noted, the TPNW simultaneously pays recognition 
to human-centred considerations through reference to 
specific principles of IHL and the need to protect civilians 
as a means of showing a balance between security and 
human-centred objectives.222
At the same time, the greater frequency and explicit 
nature of the human and victim-focused provisions in 
Article 6 in particular, alongside detailed preambular 
references to IHL principles suggests that the TPNW is 
clearly distinct from ‘hybrid’ disarmament approaches 
such as the CCW, which frames its human-centred 
motives in a much vaguer fashion. Consequently, the 
TPNW’s provisions do not demonstrate a progressive 
shift in the direction of humanitarian disarmament;223 
instead, the TPNW is predominantly human and 
victim-orientated in nature, coupled with a coinciding, 
though perhaps less influential State-centred security 
dimension. This contrasts with the CCW, where Docherty 
notes that ‘[h]umanitarian concerns led to the convening 
of the conference [to adopt the CCW], but security 
interests determined its outcome’.224 As such, seeking to 
categorise the TPNW not as a humanitarian instrument 
but rather a further example of hybrid disarmament 
seems somewhat forced and inaccurate.
However, both the malleability of identifying 
checklists,225 and the alternative, albeit inaccurate 
attempt to categorise the TPNW as a ‘hybrid’ disarmament 
instrument ultimately gives rise to more demanding 
questions as to precisely what advantages are brought 
by categorising complex disarmament instruments 
into neatly separated groupings such as ‘traditional’, 
‘hybrid’, or ‘humanitarian’ disarmament. What benefit 
does describing, or trying to place a treaty – which has 
been negotiated and developed by taking into account 
the views, interests and desires of a multitude of States 
and actors – actually bring? There are, of course, certain 
advantages, if implemented correctly. Categorisation can 
help identify trends, or periods in which certain interests 
dominated multilateral disarmament discourse.226 From 
a historical perspective, these trends can help describe 
the evolution of disarmament over longer periods of 
time and can be informative of times of change and the 
prevalence of certain underlying interests.
At the same time, attempts to try and ‘force’ the 
categorisation of the TPNW should not come at the 
expense of reflecting the reality on the ground. The 
manipulation of identifying ‘checklist’ factors discussed 
previously, either knowingly or unwillingly, ultimately 
creates a misrepresentation of the TPNW, simply in 
order to describe or argue that the treaty conforms 
to an abstractly identified category of disarmament 
instruments; ‘humanitarian disarmament’. By contrast, 
the underlying purpose of this discussion has been 
to provide an accurate reflection of the underlying 
motivations behind the TPNW. It seeks to delve beyond 
the human-centre narrative that has dominated 
discourse by instead acknowledging and highlighting 
the complex array of interests at stake during the 
negotiations. This may not paint the perfect picture of 
the TPNW that humanitarian disarmament proponents 
desire. But the conclusions reached goes beyond mere 
issues of semantics and may have tangible implications 
in our assessment of the provisions of the TPNW.
Using just one example, the conclusions reached here 
may affect our interpretation of certain aspects of the 
treaty.227 As is well known, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties establishes general 
rules on treaty interpretation under international law.228 
Under Article 31(1), a treaty ‘shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose’.229 One must consider both the 
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subsequent agreement between parties and practice of 
States regarding the interpretation of provisions,230 while 
recourse may also be given to the travaux préparatoires 
of the treaty ‘in order to confirm the meaning resulting 
from the application of article 31’, or to determine the 
meaning if the interpretation under Article 31 leads to an 
obscure or manifestly unreasonable result.231
Although the International Law Commission generally 
favoured an approach which prioritised the ordinary 
meaning of the text which ‘must be presumed to be the 
authentic expression of the intention of the parties’,232 
Articles 31 and 32 draw upon each of the traditional 
schools of interpretation;233 the textual approach, which 
presumes the ‘intentions of the parties are reflected in 
the text of the treaty’; the intent approach, which seeks 
to determine the intention of the parties adopting the 
treaty to resolve ambiguity; and the teleological school, 
which aims to ascertain the object and purpose of a 
treaty and interpret the provisions in light of this.234 
As such, the intentions of the parties constitutes an 
important consideration in the process of interpretation, 
whether this is assumed from the actual text of an 
instrument, or assessing subjective intentions from the 
travaux préparatoires to provide additional guidance in 
the absence of clarity.
Considering this understanding of treaty interpretation, 
there is substantial practical value in, and indeed a 
genuine need to acknowledge both the co-existing 
security-driven and humanitarian inspired aspects of the 
TPNW in order to accurately account for the intentions 
and underlying motivations of the negotiating parties 
to the 2017 conference. In fact, even when one takes 
the text of the treaty to constitute an expression of the 
negotiating parties,235 failure to consider the significance 
of the security-based references within the TPNW 
text ignores the intentions of negotiating States too. 
Ultimately, the failure to acknowledge the coinciding 
existence of security interests alongside genuine human-
centred concerns could potentially result in misleading 
assessments and interpretations of the TPNW and may 
even present a false account of the underlying object 
and purpose of the treaty as well.
C. DESCRIBING REALITY: THE ADVANTAGE OF 
RECOGNISING SECURITY INTERESTS
Finally, while security-based objectives and humanity 
considerations are often considered competing 
objectives balanced against each other, there seems to 
be no obvious reason why both altruistic humanitarian 
concerns and State-based security interests cannot co-
exist in order to address the threat to international peace 
and security presented by nuclear war. In fact, these two 
approaches to disarmament, though somewhat distinct 
with independent purposes, require similar action in 
the same direction and may therefore be mutually 
reinforcing to an extent.236 Borrie has previously made a 
similar point in 2005 when discussing the added value 
of humanitarian perspectives for arms control and 
disarmament efforts, arguing that:
‘This “national security” reference point remains 
relevant and important. Nor is it likely to be 
eclipsed while the nation state remains the basic 
unit of international order. But new and complex 
challenges of security this century… increasingly 
call for supplementary perspectives in order for 
them to be addressed effectively. Humanitarian 
perspectives and concepts can constitute certain 
of these supplements. They do not need to 
be viewed as exclusive alternatives to national 
security approaches in order to assist negotiating 
practitioners and can help build common 
ground in responding to collective challenges 
in security’.237
Furthermore, given the predominant influence of State-
based security considerations in prior nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament negotiations,238 including 
the NPT,239 it is arguably disingenuous to suggest that 
these existing interests were simply cast aside altogether 
by the non-aligned NNWS during the TPNW negotiations 
in favour of an exclusively humanitarian approach. In 
connection with the TPNW, Borrie, Spies and Wan have 
noted that simply;
‘because states and other actors aligned 
themselves with ICAN, it does not necessarily 
follow that they wholeheartedly accepted the value 
or principle-driven approach it promoted in support 
of a nuclear prohibition. Sometimes morals suit 
self-interest, and the normative pressure states 
supporting the TPNW hope will gather over time 
will presumably suit their national interests if it 
results in nuclear disarmament’.240
Put differently, while the human-centred approach 
advanced by ICAN offered a novel means of overcoming 
the stagnation in nuclear disarmament efforts which 
appealed to like-minded NNWS, this does not necessarily 
mean that this human-centred approach totally replaced 
underlying State-based interests in upholding security. 
Though Borrie, Spies and Wan certainly do not aim to 
discount the importance of the Humanitarian Initiative, 
they suggest that scholarly accounts which allude to a 
‘purely’ humanitarian-interest rhetoric behind the TPNW 
process is ‘a little too neat and generalized’.241 Instead, 
the TPNW demonstrates these co-existing interests 
operating in tandem, using the humanitarian reframing 
as a means of advancing co-existing State-based security 
interests. Equally, this does not contradict the fact that 
the TPNW process constituted a ‘genuine’ humanitarian 
venture by the non-aligned NNWS.242
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Furthermore, acknowledging the coinciding and 
mutually beneficial influence of security-driven and 
humanitarian considerations may increase the TPNW’s 
potential impact on the NWPS. It is worth noting that a 
primary criticism raised against the TPNW by opponents 
relates to the idealistic and morally-driven nature of the 
treaty that ‘disregards the realities of the international 
security environment’.243 This has led former US President 
Donald Trump to dismiss the TPNW and Humanitarian 
Initiative as magical thinking in January 2018,244 while 
other commentators oppose the treaty as unrealistic and 
misguided in facilitating disarmament efforts.245 As such, 
the TPNW arguably reflects an existing and growing 
divide between the non-aligned NNWS supporters of the 
treaty who seek progress on disarmament, and the fierce, 
reality-based perspective of the NWPS which oppose 
the solely humanitarian, moral arguments behind the 
TPNW. Continuing to solely emphasise the humanitarian 
inspirations of the TPNW whilst casting aside concurrently 
existing security concerns does nothing to bridge this 
growing divide.
However, by acknowledging the security driven 
concerns behind the TPNW, including the escalation of 
tensions between nuclear powers and the increased risk 
of nuclear war, TPNW supporters can provide a case for the 
necessity of the treaty on both security and humanitarian 
grounds. Rather than being condemned as idealistic, 
as opponents so frequently claim, acknowledging the 
influence of security-orientated objectives can ground 
the TPNW firmly in reality. By recognising these coinciding 
interests, TPNW proponents may be able to bridge-build 
between supporters and opponents, demonstrating how 
the motivations behind the adoption of the treaty are 
not based entirely on altruistic and moral arguments, but 
were equally driven by security-driven concerns which 
the NWPS can relate to. This embracing of the presence 
of security-concerns would not constitute a defeat for 
humanitarian disarmament; on the contrary, it offers a 
new perspective upon which the humanitarian-inspired 
motivations of both civil society and States can be 
achieved in tandem with security goals.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article began with an important point that is worth 
repeating once more;246 it is beyond question that 
humanitarian-based objectives contributed towards, and 
inspired, the negotiation of the TPNW. This humanitarian 
reframing in weapons discourse has been vital in raising 
awareness of the indiscriminate harm and the devastation 
that nuclear weapons leave behind after the security-
driven interests of the user State have been advanced. 
The novelty and success of this approach, epitomised by 
the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to ICAN in 2017,247 
should not be understated. Humanitarian disarmament 
has and will continue to play an important role in future 
disarmament discussions in the coming years.248 This is 
certainly a welcome development and offers the potential 
to shake up nuclear disarmament efforts to better reflect 
the interests of States and humanity as a whole.
Nevertheless, the discussion in Part IV has revealed how 
such security-considerations have been reflected in the 
negotiation process, preambular language and operative 
clauses of the TPNW. This analysis has helped reveal 
and demonstrate the dual-nature of the TPNW, even if 
the underlying human-centred considerations could be 
seen as taking greater prevalence compared to earlier 
humanitarian disarmament instruments. Importantly, 
this article has highlighted some important practical 
implications of this assessment and questions the need 
for categorisation of disarmament instruments in place of 
an accurate assessment of the TPNW’s actual nature.249
Yet perhaps the most significant conclusion reached 
is that these contrasting interests and perspectives each 
serve to add a different viewpoint on the necessity and 
urgency of achieving nuclear disarmament. By affording 
greater emphasis to the security-driven motivations, 
alongside the pressing humanitarian concerns which 
evidently inspired the TPNW process, one can begin to 
bridge the divide between opponents and supporters 
of the treaty by creating a case for the necessity of the 
treaty on both security and humanitarian grounds. Such 
recognition serves to reduce concerns that the TPNW 
is morally aspirational and therefore detached from 
reality. We must therefore embrace the diversity of State 
interests at play and acknowledge their coinciding, often 
mutually beneficial existence in order to fully appreciate 
and understand the underlying motivations of States to 
conclude disarmament instruments, including the TPNW.
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